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Mapping post-Brexit environmental law
Colin T. Reid1
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Abstract The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not bring about immediate changes
to the substance of environmental law in the UK, but that law will become easier
to change. The future position is complicated by devolution within the UK, where
differing policy objectives on continuing alignment with the EU and weaknesses in
the inter-governmental structures are causing problems. Environmental principles are
being given legal recognition and new structures for environmental governance being
created for each nation. These include environmental watchdogs that go some of the
way to making up for the loss of the oversight provided by the EU institutions.
Keywords Brexit · Environment · Environmental governance · Environmental
principles · Devolution
1 Background
When I participated in a conference in 2015, almost a year before the Brexit refer-
endum and when the idea of the UK leaving the EU was a speculative thought ex-
periment, not a practical reality, a number of key issues for environmental law were
identified:1
– would the legislative slate be wiped clean, with all the law coming from the EU
having to be removed and replaced, or would existing EU law be carried over and
continue in force?
1See Reid [1], [2].
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– would the future see major divergence between EU and UK laws, and in particular
would the UK embark on a programme of deregulation?
– would environmental law become more volatile and subject to short-term shifts in
policy?
– in the absence of the European Commission (Commission) and the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU), how would the government be held to account for
its environmental performance and its success or failure in meeting targets?
These questions are considered in the rest of this paper and at the time of writ-
ing in August 2020, not all of them have been answered, even though Brexit has
now formally taken place. The legal basis for this in the UK is the European Union
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Withdrawal Act) (passed before there was any Withdrawal
Agreement settled between the UK and the EU). This has now been amended by
the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (2020 Act), reflecting the
terms of the Agreement made in late 2019 between the Johnson government and the
EU.2 At present we are in the transition or implementation period provided for under
that Agreement and although the UK formally left the EU on 31 January 2020, very
little has changed. The big change will come at the end of this period, on 31 Decem-
ber 2020. At that date the ties are fully severed, unless the negotiations for a new
agreement on future trading and other relations reach a successful conclusion before
then.
Looking back at political developments over the past few years within the UK, one
of the big surprises is that the environment has featured so strongly in the planning
for a post-Brexit future, with an acceptance that substantial measures are needed to
fill the gaps created as the UK leaves the EU. At the time of the referendum, when
deregulation was very much a theme of the Leave campaign, it looked as if the EU-
based elements of environmental law might just be torn up with no replacement. Since
then there has been an acceptance across the UK that new measures are necessary to
guide the development of environmental law and policy and to ensure that public
authorities live up to their environmental commitments. The introduction of major
structural features to support environmental protection now seems certain, but at a
more detailed level, deregulatory themes continue to be significant.3
2 Start again or carry-over?
During the period of the UK’s membership of the EU, its environmental law has been
transformed and EU measures have played the leading role in this transformation.
The law on air pollution, waste, water resources, nature conservation, noise and much
more is now to be found predominantly in EU Directives and the domestic legislation
introduced to give effect to these. It was very rapidly accepted that it was not possible
to remove all EU and EU-based measures from the UK’s legal system nor to start
again with a new national regime for every area. The whole point of the supra-national
2Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2019/C 384 I/01).
3Branson [3].
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nature of the EU is that EU law is not separate from but is deeply embedded in the
national legal systems in various ways and extracting the EU elements was just not
feasible.
Accordingly, the only practical decision was to say that all existing EU law, both
legislation and judicial decisions, continues in effect.4 It now becomes a special form
of domestic law, known as “retained EU law”, subject to a number of special pro-
cedural rules for an extended internal transitional period. As domestic law, it is now
subject to amendment by the UK authorities, and in preparation for Brexit there have
been hundreds and hundreds of technical amendments under the Withdrawal Act’s
wide powers to make the adjustments necessary to give effect to Brexit,5 e.g. to cut
out the role of EU institutions in the operation of any regulatory systems.
Even at the end of the transition period, decisions of the CJEU prior to Brexit
continue to be binding on UK courts, although the Supreme Court can depart from
CJEU decisions on the same basis as it can from its own earlier precedent (the same
applies to the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland where it is the final appeal court).6
The 2020 Act7 has added the possibility of other courts being allowed to overturn
CJEU decisions,8 but this has been heavily criticised;9 if other courts could revisit an
issue settled by the CJEU, large areas of the law would become uncertain given how
much of EU environmental law rests on judicial decisions (e.g. the application of the
precautionary principle in protecting Special Areas of Conservation).
3 Divergence and deregulation
Environmental policy is a big issue in the current negotiations on the future arrange-
ments between the UK and the EU. Whereas maintaining equivalent levels of pro-
tection in this and other areas was a legal commitment under the Agreement made
with Mrs May’s government,10 the Withdrawal Agreement that has taken effect11 has
replaced this legal commitment with vaguer statements in the accompanying Politi-
cal Statement.12 As a gross over-simplification, at present the EU, in exchange for a
close relationship and open access to markets, is asking the UK to commit to contin-
4European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, ss 2-7.
5Ibid., s 8.
6Ibid., s 6.
7European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, s 26, amending s 6 of the Withdrawal Act.
8Ministry of Justice [4].
9For example, Reid [5].
10Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (2018) https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/publications/draft-agreement-withdrawal-united-kingdom-great-britain-and-northern-
ireland-european-union-and-european-atomic-energy-community-agreed-negotiators-level-14-november-
2018_en.
11Note 2 above.
12Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union
and the United Kingdom (2019/C 384 I/02 178).
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uing alignment on environmental and other matters to secure a “level playing field”.
In contrast, the UK government says that the whole point of Brexit is to have the
freedom to make its own rules and has been unwilling to make such a commitment.
In reality, the UK may not want to do much different in substance, but the freedom to
do so is ideologically important (at present).
Two factors complicate the position. The first is that in some areas, including the
environment, there may actually be a desire for moving away from EU standards.
This is not only because that fits the political views of some in government, who
see environmental measures as an obstacle to economic recovery and development,13
but also because it may be a requirement for securing trade agreements with other
partners that do not share the EU’s standards. In particular, reaching a deal with the
USA may require adjusting laws on issues such as food production to match their
standards rather than the different EU ones.
Of more immediate concern have been the implications of devolution. The envi-
ronment is one of the areas where the devolved administrations have wide respon-
sibilities (the precise division of powers under the arrangements for each nation
varies), but since the UK has a devolved system of government, not a federal one,
ultimate power still rests with the UK government. This structure was devised at a
time when membership of the EU was not seriously challenged and it is now widely
accepted that the structures for inter-governmental relations within the UK were not
fully developed. This was largely because EU membership provided shared frame-
works, constraining how far the nations within the UK could diverge within the areas
of devolved powers. There was scope for national innovation, e.g. the restructuring of
environmental governance in Wales,14 but always within the bounds set by the EU.
This meant that there was little need for detailed mechanisms for agreeing a common
approach or resolving disputes between the UK’s nations. Even the UK government’s
sole responsibility for foreign affairs, with no formal role for the devolved authori-
ties, was less problematic when it was so often exercisable within the confines of EU
policy.
The devolved administrations, especially Scotland, argued that any power in de-
volved areas (which includes most environmental matters) should pass straight from
Brussels to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. However, the Withdrawal Act allows the
UK government to keep hold of power in any area where it thinks that a common po-
sition across the whole UK is desirable, even though the subject-matter is normally
devolved.15 The intensity of the political storms over this is shown by the fact that
the 2020 Act approving the Withdrawal Agreement and activating these provisions
was passed without the consent of any of the devolved Parliaments, something which
is not legally necessary but which the devolution legislation says is “normally” ex-
pected for measures that have an impact on devolved matters.16 Such tensions were
reinforced in the summer of 2020 by the UK government’s proposals on an Internal
13Note 3 above.
14Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015.
15European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 12.
16E.g. Scotland Act 1998, s 28(8).
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Market,17 based on a strong and wide application of the principles of mutual recog-
nition and non-discrimination. This would still allow the devolved authorities to set
their own standards, but at the risk having them undermined in practice by the need
to accept goods produced to the potentially different standards set for the economi-
cally dominant English market. For example, producers in Scotland subjected to new
restrictions introduced by the Scottish Government to protect the environment would
face being undercut by producers from England, operating free from these restric-
tions, taking advantage of their right to access the Scottish market.
Alongside the constitutional arguments of how power should be distributed, there
are sharp policy differences. The current Scottish Government is committed to “dy-
namic alignment” with the EU, maintaining existing standards and keeping in step
with developments in the EU (with a view to an independent Scotland being able to
rejoin the EU).18 This is in marked contrast to the UK government’s desire to “take
back control” and have a free hand to raise or lower standards as it thinks fit (or
as necessary in the light of trade deals with other partners). A further complication
arises from the special provisions dealing with the island of Ireland. These mean that
Northern Ireland is legally bound to dynamic alignment with the EU by virtue of its
unique position under the Withdrawal Agreement, maintaining its links with the EU
customs union and single market. There are thus considerable tensions over the future
direction of environmental regulation.
At a more basic level, the fact that environmental matters are devolved means that
each nation has been making its own responses to the issues arising from Brexit.
Although there have been repeated statements about the desirability of co-operation
and collaboration, in fact each nation has proceeded on its own timetable, with the
UK government able to move faster in producing a detailed scheme for the future.
This means that a fragmented picture of environmental governance is inevitable. The
UK Government (with responsibility for England and non-devolved matters) has pro-
duced detailed proposals that fill the gaps left by withdrawal from the EU. These are
included as part of wider environmental legislation going through Parliament during
2020; the Environment Bill.19 Northern Ireland (which lacked an operational As-
sembly and Government between January 2017 and January 2020) is joining these
arrangements.20 Scotland has developed its own proposals to fill the gaps, and again
these are undergoing the legislative process during 2020; the UK Withdrawal from
the European Union (Continuity) (Scotland) Bill (Continuity Bill).21 In Wales, the
future policy is not yet clear and any legislative proposals have been deferred until
after the elections in May 2021.22
17Department for Business, Enterprise and Industrial Strategy [6].
18Policy Memorandum on the UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Continuity) (Scotland) Bill (SP
Bill 77), paras 20-33.
19Environment Bill (HC Bill 9 of 2019-21); detailed references are to the Bill as first introduced.
20Environment Bill, Scheds 2 and 3.
21UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Continuity) (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 77); detailed references
are to the Bill as first introduced.
22First Minister’s Statement on the Legislative programme; Record of Proceedings of Senedd, 15.7.2020;
Plenary para.334.
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4 Volatility
A notable feature of EU law-making processes is that they are slow. This means that
they lack flexibility, but for large-scale environmental problems this can be a virtue
since once the law is made it is hard to change. This enables fixed and long-term
targets to be established to deal with problems such as water quality, climate change
and waste reduction, where long-term action involving many parties is needed to
improve the position.
Now that the UK will be acting on its own, it will be able to change the law much
more quickly. This enables a fast response to changing circumstances, but also leaves
the law much more vulnerable to short-term political pressures. For example, in the
past a long-term plan for regular increases in the tax on petrol, to combat air pollution
and climate change, never came into operation because there was always a temporary
reason for not increasing the tax in any particular year.
Some steps are being taken towards longer-term planning. In particular, the current
Environment Bill requires the UK government to produce an environmental improve-
ment plan “for significantly improving the natural environment” over a period of at
least 15 years.23 Progress will have to be reported annually and it is to be accom-
panied by a number of statutory long-term targets in various sectors, including the
priority areas of air quality, water, biodiversity, and resource efficiency and waste re-
duction. The process of developing these is just beginning,24 but they are likely to be
less extensive than the objectives set under EU laws such as the Water Framework
Directive25 (the statutory requirement is for targets on just “at least one matter within
each priority area”), as well as being more vulnerable to future adjustment. An Envi-
ronment Strategy for Scotland is also being developed,26 but without the legal basis
of the environmental improvement plan and at its present stage it is focused on broad
objectives rather than specific legal targets.
The increased volatility arising from the change from EU to UK law-making also
brings a constitutional issue for the devolved administrations. Within the EU they
had to follow EU law, but that was made by a formal, open and consensual process.
Although it was the UK as the Member State that had the formal decision-making
role, the early stages of the process were transparent and there were ways in which
the devolved administrations could engage in them. Now they will often be bound
(formally or in practice as a result of the dominance of the English market) by what-
ever is decided in London, with no proper inter-governmental procedure to ensure
that attention is paid to the different national views. Recent experience on a range of
matters has shown that important matters can be decided without proper notice to the
devolved administrations, let alone meaningful consultation or agreement.27
23Environment Bill, cll 1-14.
24DEFRA [7].
25Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a
framework for Community action in the field of water policy [2000] OJ L 327/1.
26Scottish Government [8].
27For example, opening statement by Cabinet Secretary Roseanna Cunningham to the Environ-
ment, Climate Change and Land Reform Committee of the Scottish Parliament on 29 October 2019
http://www.parliament.scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=12328&i=111406&c=2225301&s=.
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5 Principles
A further feature affecting the future shape of environmental law in the UK is the role
and status of environmental principles. The nature of the arrangements for carrying
over EU law means that the environmental principles embedded in the EU treaties
would be lost if not specifically recognised in some way. Both the UK and the Scot-
tish governments have been willing to give legal recognition to the four key envi-
ronmental principles – preventive, precautionary, rectification at source and polluter
pays – with England further giving express recognition to the principle of integrating
environmental concerns into all areas of policy.
The details of the proposals differ. Under the Environment Bill (for England and
Northern Ireland), this recognition is taking the form of a legal duty to prepare a pol-
icy statement on the principles, with a duty on Ministers to “have due regard” to this
in making policy.28 In Scotland, the obligation in making policy is to “have regard” to
the principles themselves, assisted by ministerial guidance.29 Moreover, this duty ap-
plies not just to the Scottish Ministers but to all public authorities developing policies
covered by the Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005. That Act applies
the process of strategic environmental assessment based on EU law to most policy
making, not just to the categories of plans and programmes covered by the EU Di-
rective,30 so that the scope of the duty in Scotland will be much wider. Nevertheless,
the exclusion of budgetary plans has been noted, especially in the context of argu-
ments for a “green recovery” and “building back better” from the current Covid-19
recession. Critics are arguing for a wider and stronger duty, that all public authorities
should be required to apply, or act in accordance with, the principles in everything
they do (e.g. taking individual regulatory decisions), not just in policy-making.31
6 Accountability
In considering the consequences of Brexit on environmental governance, the loss of
the Commission’s oversight and ultimately the CJEU’s power to compel compliance
was widely recognised as one of the most significant impacts.32 This removes im-
portant mechanisms for holding the government to account, not least because of the
high cost of legal actions in the UK. The need for something to fill this gap has been
accepted, but different plans have been developed in the different parts of UK at dif-
ferent speeds. Such variation is in part necessary to fit with the separate governance
and court structures in each nation, but the UK government’s speed in making its
own plans left little opportunity for discussion of an integrated approach with the
other administrations. The emerging picture, therefore is of a patchwork of different
28Environment Bill, cll 16-18.
29Continuity Bill, ss 9-14.
30Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment
of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment [2001] OJ L 197/30.
31House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee [9], paras 27-43.
32UKELA [10], Round-Table [11].
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arrangements, and there is a strong case for a more considered review of how well
these are working together once the dust has settled.33 Furthermore, it seems impossi-
ble for the new arrangements to be fully operational on a legislative basis by the time
Brexit takes full effect at the end of 2020 and non-statutory interim arrangements are
likely.
The Environment Bill before the UK Parliament provides for the creation of the
Office for Environmental Protection (OEP), an independent body to review govern-
ment policy and receive and investigate complaints of non-compliance with environ-
mental law.34 This will cover things done by the UK government for the whole of
the UK and for England. Northern Ireland has agreed that the Office for Environ-
mental Protection will also cover devolved matters there. Scotland is proposing its
own oversight body, Environmental Standards Scotland (ESS).35 Wales has a differ-
ent governance framework for environmental matters, based on the Well-Being of
Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015, and detailed plans for the future are being left
until after the May 2021 elections.36
No domestic body can match the independence of the powerful external bodies
provided by the EU, but there should be structures to provide for the oversight ar-
rangements as strong a guarantee of independence from government as is possible.
The fact that appointments are in the hands of ministers for the OEP has been criti-
cised and although in Scotland appointments will have to be approved by the Scottish
Parliament, the ministers still have some role. In both cases governmental control
over the resources provided to the oversight bodies has also raised concerns. More-
over, the OEP is going to have multiple roles, being involved in reviewing progress
on environmental plans and advising government, as well as handling complaints,
creating a possible conflict of interests in the oversight body.
In terms of the accountability mechanisms, there are significant differences be-
tween what is proposed for the OEP and ESS. The OEP will have a role in monitoring
progress in improving the environment in line with the environmental improvement
plan as well as progress towards the statutory targets set. In this capacity it will pro-
duce annual progress reports. It will also have the power to report on any matter
relating to the implementation of environmental law; these reports are to be laid be-
fore Parliament and require a ministerial response. The OEP will also have a role in
relation to failures to comply with environmental law. It can act if it considers that
there is a serious failure by a public authority to comply with the law, issuing a de-
cision notice identifying the failure and specifying the steps to be taken to remedy
the breach. The authority receiving it must produce a written response to the notice,
but the notice itself is not directly enforceable. The OEP can, however, seek an envi-
ronmental review before the Upper Tribunal of the authority’s original (non-)action
which amounts to the failure to comply with environmental law. This is to proceed
on the basis of the standard judicial review principles and remedies, thereby limit-
ing review to issues of legality, not merits, and excluding the possibility of fines or
33House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee [9], para.139.
34Environment Bill, cll 21-40.
35Continuity Bill, ss15-41.
36Note 22 above.
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other sanctions as a result of the non-compliance. This structure has been criticised
as falling well short of the substantial powers wielded by the Commission and CJEU.
For ESS, acting on its own initiative or on receipt of complaints, its role will be to
monitor the effectiveness of environmental law and its implementation as well as pub-
lic authorities’ compliance with environmental law. Its monitoring extends to consid-
ering the implementation of international obligations (which under the UK’s dualist
approach create legal rights and duties only if and when incorporated by parliamen-
tary legislation). ESS will have the power to issue an improvement report where it
finds a failure to comply with, or to apply or implement effectively, environmental
law. In response to such a report the Scottish Ministers must prepare an improvement
plan setting out the measures to be taken, the timescale and monitoring arrangements.
This plan must be presented to Parliament and can be rejected, requiring a revised
plan to be produced. In the event of non-compliance with the law that is causing
environmental harm or a risk of such harm, ESS will be able to issue a compliance
notice requiring the authority concerned to take remedial steps. The authority can
appeal to the sheriff court against a compliance notice. In the event of the authority
failing to comply with a notice without reasonable excuse, the matter can be referred
to the Court of Session which can order further enforcement measures and treat the
failure as a contempt of court, opening the path to substantial penalties. In serious
cases, ESS can also seek judicial review.
This amounts to a considerably wider and stronger system of oversight than for the
OEP, but a number of concerns have been raised. The definition of “environmental
law” is potentially rather narrow, both in itself (some environmentally significant mat-
ters may not involve provisions “mainly concerned with environmental protection”)
and because the Bill excludes climate targets and access to environmental informa-
tion. In both of these areas there are other monitoring and reporting structures, but
their exclusion prevents a holistic view of environmental matters being taken. Simi-
larly, ESS is not to act on the basis of failures arising from an individual regulatory
decision. This is designed to prevent overlap with existing appeal and review mecha-
nisms and to focus attention on strategic and widespread concerns, but the experience
with the Commission and CJEU is that it can be an individual case, not a systemic
issue, that raises significant points requiring attention.
With the legislation for these new bodies still being debated, and proposals in
Wales still to emerge, it is too early to make definitive statements about how ef-
fectively the new structures will fill the governance gap left by the loss of the EU
procedures. For all that there are criticisms of aspects of these, one really positive
point must be emphasised. Around the time of the referendum, when deregulatory
rhetoric held sway, it seemed unlikely that any mechanisms would be put in place to
replace the oversight exercised by the EU institutions. The current proposals may not
be perfect but do go a long way to ensuring that the governments will still be held
accountable for their environmental performance.
7 The future
Although the UK has now formally left the EU, the future still remains deeply uncer-
tain, even more so since Covid-19 has disrupted all political processes. A lot depends
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on the outcome of the negotiations on the future relationship between the EU and
the UK and what priorities the UK has in relation to other international relations and
trade agreements. Until the position on those is clearer, there will remain uncertainty
over the future direction of the UK’s environmental policy and the extent of align-
ment with the EU on environmental (and other) standards and policies. There is also
uncertainty over the effectiveness of the new oversight mechanisms currently being
established.
Further problems are arising because of devolution. The constitutional arguments
over where power should lie are exacerbated by the fact that the Scottish and UK
governments have different ambitions for the future relations with the EU and the
resulting tensions are placing great strain on the structures for inter-governmental
relations. These structures were created on the basis of continuing EU membership,
and therefore designed to deal with only limited divergence between the different ad-
ministrations, all operating within the same EU “envelope”. They were not designed
to cope with the significantly different plans and policies being pursued as at present.
For Wales, detailed environmental governance proposals are still to emerge, whilst
the full impact of Northern Ireland’s unique position, committed to close ties with
the EU, still remains to be worked out, in practical and policy terms.
As has been the case for the past four years, there are lots of moving parts to con-
sider. Few of them are coming a halt and even when they do it is not in an order
that allows for new frameworks for environmental policy and governance to be log-
ically assembled. As has been the case for too long now, the only certainty is more
uncertainty.
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